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This paper is aimed at the impact of particularism in political 
decision-making. It is argued that political decisions are 
particularistic according to the goal and circumstances, in which 
they are made. It is still unclear, which consequences – good or 
bad – particularistic component of political decisions may lead to. 
The focal question is to what extent the particularism in political 
decisions can help in resolving social problems or does harm to 
society.  In the framework of the network analysis, the article 
presents organizational and procedural examples of particularism 
predominance and political means of its balancing. As an 
illustration of completely particularistic system by institutional and 
practical means of decision-making, the case of Ukraine is 
showed. It is ascertained that the dominance of particularism in 
political decision-making can lead to ambivalent effects: being 
highly destructive for stability of the system it can be saving for 
democratic modes of governance. 
 
Keywords: particularism, political decisions, political networks, 
groups of interests, clubs. 
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Contemporary political discourse is essentially based on criticism 
of the decision-making, which explicitly focuses on the exclusive 
benefits for particular groups of political elite or top business 
circles. Meanwhile, true democratic governance must aim at the 
multiplicity of needs and interests of society. The problem of 
representing interests in decision-making was highlighted in a 
number of theoretical studies but remains unsolved. Should a 
political decision meet the overall interests of a society according 
to Aristotle’s tradition? The aim of politics in its sense is to 
achieve common public wellbeing. Is a political decision always a 
decision ad hoc, in sense of implementing unique interests of those 
who take it or unique circumstances under which it is made? 
Moreover, in modern societies there is a wide spectrum of 
overlapping (or even conflicting) social interests, which 
aggregation is difficult to implement through traditional patterns of 
political representation. 
 
The political decision сan be determined in two dimensions: 
(i) as a technological transfer of political power into governing 
social processes, or (ii) as a central element in transfer of political 
demands of different social groups into the means and methods of 
regulating social relationships which are clear for the whole 
society. Political decisions differ from other types of 
administrative decisions due to their specific role in regulation of 
social relationships in highly indeterminate environment, co-
existing with the conflict of interests of groups regarding public 
goods distribution. The latter characteristic of a political decision 
proves the presence of a particularistic element in its basis.  
 
Etymologically, particularism means ‘seeking separation’. There 
are several discourses within social sciences, which deal with 
various categories of particularism: ethical, cultural, political. In 
the ethic discourse, the particularism applied to decision-making is 
studied in the framework of theoretical debate as for implementing 
moral norms and rules, e.g. whether following moral norms 
contributes to making a better decision? In this context, 
particularism is defined through opposition towards universalism, 
principals, generalism. Scientists, who use that approach to 
decision-making, insist on the fact that following rules and moral 
                   




Studies of Changing Societies: Comparative and 
Interdisciplinary Focus Vol. 1’2017 
 
 
© SCS Journal 
63 
norms can contribute to the development of optimum decisions 
(see Horgan and Timmons 2007). On the contrary, proponents of 
particularism claim that following strict rules and regulations may 
result in ineffective decisions, as important details or contextual 
specifics are often ignored in them (see Dancy 2004: 78-89, 193-
199). The intermediate, hybrid definition of particularism in 
decision-making is proposed in the terms of ‘moral realism’ (see 
DeAnna and Martinelli 2015, Zamzov 2015) or ‘rule of sensitive 
particularism’ (see Schauer 1991: 94-100). It is stressed that 
decisions should rely on normative principles and provide results 
needed for society. At the same time, the overall possibility to 
follow norms and rules is presupposed by the circumstances, in 
which a decision is made.  
 
In studies of particularistic practices in social and cultural context, 
scientists tried to identify cultural differences in decision-making 
styles related to complex decisions (see Dabić, Tipurić and Podrug 
2015, Sangmpam 2012, Sachdeva, Singh, and Medin 2011). In this 
sense, particularism ‘seeks, in general, to affirm the identity and 
peculiarity of local or regional political features’ (Sangmpam 
2012: 51).  
 
In political science particularism is recognized as instrumental 
category for analyzing electoral processes, activity of political 
parties, correlation between legislative and executive power 
branches and political expenses (see Kriner and Reeves 2015, 
Suiter and O’Malley 2014, Kernell 2010, Milner and Mukherjee 
2010). Particularism is a characteristic of political decisions 
oriented on lobbying individual goals and interests resulting in 
narrowing or excluding a wide range of representation of social 
interests from policy-making. Therefore, particularism is defined 
as ‘policies which emphasize the special interest of a given power, 
even at the price of disrupting existing organizations or power 
relationship’ (Wallensteen 1984:243). Other study rely on 
particularism as ‘the ability of policymakers to further their careers 
by catering to narrow interests rather than broader national 
platforms’ (Gaviria et al, 2000: 8).  
 
Nonetheless, there is a lack of research, which could provide 
methodological impetus for adequate analysis of the role of 
particularism in political decision-making. Taking all stated above 
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together, a question arises: In which way particularism in political 
decision-making affects the power institutions and public control. 
Are particularistic practices obliged to be a destructive factor for 
the political system?  
 
The purpose of the present work is to identify the most common 
particularistic practices and their impact on the consequences of 
political decisions. Two aspects will be considered: the theoretical 
one involves assumptions of the theory of political decisions, with 
special focus on policy network analysis, and the analytical one, 
which is based on reviewing forms of political particularism 
(groups of interests and clubs) and particularistic procedure 
practices (logrolling, electoral particularism, localism). In this 
paper I suggest to determine particularism in political decisions 
through the category of goal-setting and accordingly through the 
interests of participants of decision-making process. I consider 
political particularism as the pursuit of private interests by 
individuals or groups within the political decision-making. I 
assume that political particularism can possess two options of goal-
setting: the first – when some actors place their interests up to the 
public ones and try to use the latter for their benefit, the second one 
– when particularistic interests are not discordant with collective 
ones and may encourage the decisions that meet common goods.  
It should be notice that studying particularism in political decision 
enables to go beyond the individual modes of governance and 
focus on the effects conditioned by specific decision-making 
practices.  
 
Methodological Basis of Studying Particularism in Political 
Decisions  
 
In further analysis, the key categories are political decisions and 
the interest connected with them. Therefore, it seems appropriate 
to turn at this point to theoretical approaches bind the 
understanding of interests of decision-makers with goal-setting and 
their activity. What first comes to mind is rational choice theory 
and incrementalism. In the framework of rational choice theory, 
the interest is presupposed by rational calculation and profit, which 
can be received from decision-making (see Hastie and Dawes 
2010, Twersky and Kahneman 1986). Political particularism in this 
theoretical understanding is characterized by the rent-seeking 
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behavior of politicians and governmental officials. As a political 
market brokers and suppliers of goals, they are trying to ensure 
private interests in the framework of existing institutional 
restrictions (see Congleton and Hillman 2015). They can respond 
to the demands of rent-seekers and simultaneously act as 
racketeers who require rents under the threat of unprofitable 
decisions of particular interest groups. Politicians and officials, 
engaged in government regulation, act to maximize their own 
benefit which is expressed either in the form of increasing taxes or 
in the form of bribes and kickbacks. According to the principles of 
the rational choice theory, it seems impossible to assemble the 
exhaustive list of interests and priorities and to turn them into 
public ones. Interest groups’ rent-seeking behavior distorts 
permanently the process of goal-setting and contributes to the 
occurrence of different forms of fail state. 
 
Incrementalism is based on the assertion that interest is the main 
source that motivates political actors on certain actions to achieve 
goals (see Anderson and Harbridge 2010, Lindblom and 
Woodhouse 1993). However, the dynamics of decision-makers’ 
preferences and their contractors, and the difference in their 
interpretation of their needs presuppose transforming decision-
making positions and interlocking conflict of interest. This 
situation enhances the fragmentation of shared actions, emphasizes 
inner conflicts between the participants of decision-making. If the 
certain actors’ interests are not taken into account, then they start 
to resist and activate the opposite flows in goal-setting, which 
increases governmental expenses. But, neither the theory of 
rational choice, nor incrementalism give a full picture of 
interactions of participants during the process of decision-making 
as they do not detect exposure of value or socio-cultural aspect of 
particularism in decision-making.  Analytical patterns of studying 
political decisions have to take into account peculiarities of a 
certain situation, in which they were formed and implemented. 
Besides, the process of generating of political decisions often 
remains hidden from public. It seems that network analysis is the 
most appropriate means of assessing particularism in working out 
political decisions.  
 
Policy network analysis offers reasonable methodological tools to 
describe and differentiate groups of public and private entities 
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(organizations and individuals) engaged into the process of 
creating political agenda (see Song and Eveland 2015, Lazer et al 
2010, Saaty and Vargas 2006, Heydemann 2004, McClurg 2003). 
Moreover, it can detect the interests of participants in decision-
making. Networks are groups of actors arising around issues 
members of which share interrelation and common resources. 
Network’ members cannot achieve the goals without the resources 
held by their partners. In this way, network analysis enables to 
outline goals, interests and motives of participants in working out 
decisions. The processes of making political decisions depend on 
subjectivity of networks, the manner of interactions between its 
participants and the degree of network openness. Networks with 
open access provide channels of direct communication between 
governmental institutions and citizens, thereby expanding the 
range of participatory practices for society in shaping the political 
agenda. In this decision-making format, a political particularism is 
balanced through engaging citizens into the political process that 
leads to consideration of a wide range of public interests.  This can 
enhance the legitimacy of decisions. 
 
In closed networks, the connections arise between individual actors 
and have informal character. In this case, the process of political 
decision-making occurs within a narrow elite circle or within the 
community, ethnic, family networks by acquiring them 
bureaucratic capital – these are ‘networks of privilege’ 
(Heydemann 2004). Network interactions can transform into 
patron-client relationship in which corruption acts as an alternative 
means of providing political interests. Corrupt practices occur if a 
shortage of opportunities to influence the public decision-making 
exists. The latter became a subject of trade, the goods, which can 
be distributed through the network marketing, and the networks 
turn into channels of distributing bureaucratic services. A narrow 
range of interests of network participants specifies political 
particularism in such formats of decision-making. Political 
decisions are being implemented as laws on public policy, focused, 
primarily, on the interests of the network participants. As a result, 
such decisions have low level of legitimacy in the perception of 
citizens or other political actors outside the network.  
 
Figuring out the type of network connection in the political 
structure enables to allocate the central and peripheral actors, 
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density of interconnections, lobby capabilities of a network. 
Typically, the networks contain nodes with many connections – 
hubs, which essentially determine the network capabilities. They 
are formed on the intersection of interests of power holders and 
business groups that get an access to a shared profit via their 
participation in decision-making networks. Hubs are characterized 
by greater ability to exchange and obtain capital, information and 
self-occupied focal position. In this case, the organizational forms 
of particularism of decision-making are ‘interest groups’. 
 
Organizational and Procedural Particularistic Activity 
 
Interest groups or, as they are also called ‘special-interest groups’ 
(see Ramanna 2015:17) – are unities, whose purpose is to express 
and protect special interests. Their main difference from political 
parties is the goal-setting. Interest groups do not aim to come to 
power and fight for its conquest. They only try to influence the 
content of political decisions to implement stakes (Martini 2012: 1-
3). Nonetheless, the ambiguous effect of interest groups on 
decision-making is underlined. For instance in the conception of 
selective regulating risks, particularism appears as an activity of 
empowered political groups aimed at creation of structures and 
mechanisms to organize a wide range of filters for social risks in 
sake of stability of the entire political system. In this sense, 
particularism is present in political decisions in order to ensure 
security and decrease complexity of the environment. Political 
systems manage to clean the collective expectations from a part of 
risks for public life, which may provoke social stresses (Zolo, 
1991: 40). From this point of view, particularism has a function of 
ensuring stability of a political system.  
 
In the perspective, which can be called destructive-consequent, 
interest groups adversely affect the functioning of the political 
system. Such groups act as providers of private influence on 
political decision-making. Everything that happens in politics can 
be seen as a result of ‘unfair play’ of various business groups. 
Arguments in favor of this vision are as follows:   
 
(1) The existence of interest groups causes inequality of 
opportunities for the influence on the process of political 
decision-making. Besides, business groups have more such 
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opportunities opposed to those groups, which do not have 
sufficient resources.  
(2)  More powerful interest groups try to create barriers for the 
redistribution of social benefits that badly affects the overall 
state of society and could trigger social conflicts in the future.  
 
(3)  The dominance of interest groups in political decision-making 
can lead to a monopoly on representation of public interests. 
This distorts the core principle of representation, which 
becomes reduced to transactions between interest groups and 
bureaucracy. 
 
In the framework of another approach, which I term ‘cumulative-
consequent’, particularistic interests are transformed into the 
common goal. In trying to achieve particularistic goals the actors 
can contribute to the accelerated decision-making by providing 
financial or organizational support. Such an approach enables to 
get more balanced decision. Particularism also helps to facilitate 
consensus and collective decision-making by overcoming the 
problem of considering of the multiplicity of interests. 
 
One of the mechanisms, by which interest groups can influence the 
formation of decisions in legislative sphere, is logrolling. This is a 
simple way of indirect compensation, when political actors can 
exchange votes during hearings for different issues. This procedure 
cancels the demand that the voting for any issue should be 
beneficial for the majority of voters. This mechanism allows 
securing the support of stakeholders, and provides the latest to 
promote their interests in legislation. The classic form of logrolling 
is ‘pork barrel’ – a legislative mechanism that includes a set of 
small local projects. In order to obtain the approval, the decision-
makers add to the bill a package of multiple proposals, often 
weakly related to the initial draft, yet profitable for different 
political groups. In order to ensure its passing, more and more new 
proposals (‘pork’) are added, until a conviction that the law should 
be approved by the majority. Ginsburg (2009: 30) notes the 
positive effect of this form of particularism on legislative processes 
‘that a certain amount of interest group activity can be helpful to 
stabilize a constitutional bargain – the optimal level of rent-seeking 
may be greater than zero’. Yet such practices of particularism 
                   




Studies of Changing Societies: Comparative and 
Interdisciplinary Focus Vol. 1’2017 
 
 
© SCS Journal 
69 
possess risks for democracy. Vitally important decisions 
(restriction of civil rights, freedom of speech or press, etc.) can be 
purchased through providing private additional discounts and 
satisfying of local interests (see Evans 1994). It is worth to note 
that the decision, taken as a result of logrolling, mainly supports 
the interests of certain groups, but not of an average citizen.  
 
In the context of electoral process, particularism always occurs and 
may have ambivalent impact on decision-making. One of 
widespread practices of electoral particularism is localism, which 
‘in politics translates into particularism in policies – policies that 
distribute benefits to specific constituents’ (Kernell 2010: 344). 
Localism is represented on the beneficiaries of geographically 
targeted spending. Exploring particularistic political spending 
patterns and interactions between parties and voters, parties and 
their representatives in the executive branch, Suiter and O'Malley 
(2014: 28-29) concluded that the allocation of resources at the 
ministerial level in conjunction with electoral system incentives 
leads to authoritarian forms of distribution, where ministerial 
priorities show the interests of the parties, which they represent in 
the government. The consequences of such a process may be 
excessive influence of regional elites on national policy-making. 
Particularistic systems and decisions, which they produce, have 
advantage of having information about preferences of their voters. 
Thus, they motivate legislators to focus on the needs of the 
electorate (at least part of it) and to create the mechanisms of 
competitiveness among political actors, which will boost the 
efficiency of the political process. Albeit they can create 
asymmetry in the representation of interests in decision-making, 
particularly in favor of certain regions. This situation has 
disintegrating potential for the state order. This may cause a desire 
in some regions to greater autonomy, calls for separatism or even 
radical changes in the territorial structure of the state.  
 
Note that most of the political particularism is considered in the 
context of domestic politics. However, in foreign policy-making 
there is also a considerable particularistic component. 
Particularism in international affairs is not unique for unilateral 
strategies but also can be found in the institutionalized forms of 
global governance based on the multilateral principles.  
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Decision-‘Clubbing’: Particularistic Patterns at the 
Multilateral Platform 
 
One of the key advantages of network analysis approach to 
political decision-making, in my opinion, is that it best meets the 
current realities of the formation of political processes that include 
all levels of governance, from local to global. International politics 
is characterized by complex structured networks, containing hubs 
with many connections, where power and economic resources are 
concentrated. Actors, who perform at such sites or nearby, have 
more opportunities to influence decision-making than other 
members of the network do. In this sense, the network analysis is 
useful for studying political particularism in the frame of club 
decision-making.   
 
Clubs can be determined as alliances with limited number of 
participants and non-public format of decision-making. In the 
simplest club-models the institutionalized procedures of decision-
making are even not recognized as each club-member is 
considered to be club representative (Kawai, Petri and Sisli-
Ciamarra, 2009:3). International organizations show steady 
tendency towards sticking to the club format of decision-making 
where a narrow circle of the most powerful states dominates, for 
instance as Quint (USA, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany) 
in NATO. Scholars allocate ‘clubs of lobbyists’, which form 
within the international entities in order to promote common 
interests, ‘clubs of willing’ that is pattern of ‘selective 
multilateralism’ and ‘clubs of relevant’ (e.g. Group of 20) as 
autonomous multilateral bodies (see Rinke and Schnecker 2013: 
24-27). Despite sharp criticism, the international club entities are 
used for informal negotiations and seeking for compromises. Clubs 
enable to prepare basis for a legally binding agreement, support 
decision-making processes within international institutions and in 
some cases to overcome impasses that hinder reforms of the 
multilateral system. The club decision-making model as a type of 
organizational form of particularism plays a constructive role when 
an operational ‘ad hoc’ solution is needed. A vivid example is a 
reactive decision on March 2014 of the G7 leaders on the Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea. The decision to stop participation ‘in 
activities associated with the preparation of the scheduled G8 
Summit in Sochi in June’ (Statement by G7 Nations Summits > 
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Road to the 2014 Sochi Summit, 2014) and It was clear signal to 
Russia about the unacceptability of aggressive unilateralism and  
perhaps even warned of a further offensive on Ukraine.  
 
Yet, clubs as a form of political governance are characterized by 
exclusive membership, elitism, informality and lack of 
accountability. Therefore, legitimacy of decisions, taken within 
clubs, usually is under doubt in the eyes of the non-included 
(Vinnykova, 2014:92). Permanent ‘clubbing’ the process of 
decision-making within multilateral realm can produce effect of 
perceptive marginalization of non-club-members and provoke 
tension up to cleavages within international organizations. 
Ultimately, club-model particularism can discredit the mandatory 
nature of international law. 
 
Global clubs and tendency ‘clubbing’ among member-states in 
international organizations are not the only forms of particularistic 
decision-making at the supranational level. A commonly known 
defect of policy-making in the EU is the dominance of national 
interests of member-states that makes it more difficult to reach a 
decision that will be beneficial for the whole community. Taking 
into account the highly heterogenic level of European 
governmental system, reaching consolidated decisions at the 
interstate level is an extremely difficult task. Nonetheless, it is not 
the pluralism of member-states’ interests that causes the problem. 
Political particularism in the EU shows up through the 
fractionalization of the member-states into groups for lobbying 
separate interests during the elaboration of general European 
decisions (see Vinnykova 2015). Some alliances have 
institutionalized form, e.g. Visegrad Group (Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Czech Republic). Others are mainly just political 
alliances expressing themselves through outlining their particular 
interests during decision-making. Geopolitical factors associated 
primarily with the geographical location or a shared experience of 
integration into the EU also strengthen particularism in decision-
making as ‘north-south’ member-state grouping (see Blavokus and 
Pagoulatos 2011, Kaeding and Selck 2005). An informal, but also 
very important factor, causing some existing and potential 
conflicts, is the orientation of domestic and foreign patronage 
provided by the ‘European core’ – France and Germany. Due to 
the combination of geographical, historical and political reasons, 
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France has more influence in the Mediterranean region, and 
Germany dominates among the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, thus controlling the entire Eastern vector of the EU foreign 
policy. In terms of network approach, France and Germany are the 
hubs of resources and political influence that determine patronage 
agenda in the region. However, this positioning has repeatedly 
provoked consolidated barriers to strategic decision making. 
 
Yet, challenges from informal alliances are the most serious when 
political particularism embodied in institutionalized forms through 
the distribution of positions and preferred seats in the EU 
institutions. For last decade, an informal alliance of mutual support 
Germany and Poland clearly affected the allocation of top 
positions in the EU political Olympus. Polish Erzy Buzek the 
President of the European Parliament in 14 July 2009 – 17 January 
2012 has been preceded by German politician Hans-Gert Pöttering 
(16 January 2007 – 14 July 2009) and succeeded again by German 
Martin Schulz (17 January 2012 – 17 January 2017). Former 
Polish Prime-Minister Donald Tusk took the position of the 
President of the European Council in 2014 and has been re-elected 
again on 9 March 2017. In addition, Germany and Poland 
dominate in the ten of twenty-three the European Parliament 
Committees. Six committees are led by Parliament members from 
Germany (Foreign Affairs, International Trade, Budgetary Control, 
Employment and Social Affairs, Culture and Education, Money 
laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion) and four committees 
are headed by MEPs from Poland (Security and Defense, Industry, 
Research and Energy, Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Constitutional Affairs).  
 
Though UK and Italy have 73 seats respectively in the European 
Parliament, that is more than 20 seats compared to Poland (51), 
they dominate only in two committees each. France with 74 MEPs 
in EP runs three committees: Budgets, Transport and Tourism, 
Fisheries. The rest Committees are headed by representatives from 
Belgium (Internal Market and Consumer Protection), Bulgaria 
(Regional Development), the Czech Republic (Legal Affairs) 
Lithuania (Women's Rights and Gender Equality), Romania 
(Environment, Public Health and Food Safety) and Sweden 
(Petitions). Other member-states are not represented in the heading 
the European Parliament Committees (see official web site of the 
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European Parliament Committees). The asymmetry in procedure 
and institutional opportunities for the benefit of several member-
states is obvious.  
 
The most vivid particularism in the EU decision-making occurs 
during budget approval (see Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015). 
In addition to the fact that every member-state always tries to get 
as many preferences as possible, there are groups of countries, 
which have similar views at the expenses. During negotiation on 
the Financial framework of the EU for 2014-2020 emerged at least 
two alliances in attitudes toward the issue of ‘cutting spending’. 
‘Friends of Better Spending Non-Paper’ (Austria, Germany, 
Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden), advocated a more efficient 
budget allocation. In opposite, ‘Friends of Cohesion’ (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic and 
Spain)’ expressed concern about excessive cuts (Mendez, 
Wishlade and Bachtler  2012: 10). There were other watersheds in 
the issue of budgeting that provided different coalitions among 
member-states (see Uilenreef 2016, Mendez, Wishlade and 
Bachtler 2012: 11-12). But what should be highlighted that  due to 
dominance of particularism in passing the EU budget, such an 
essential component of functioning of the European Union as 
expenses on foreign political activity (Global Europe) received 
only 6,1% of the general European expenses for 7 years 
(Multinational Financial Framework 2014: 9). It is worth 
mentioning that cohesive foreign policy with an advanced 
infrastructure ensuring could help in preventing many problems 
including migration crisis.  
 
One can give numerous examples of particularism in political 
decision-making embedded into institutionalized forms and official 
procedures. Nevertheless, what happens when particularism in 
decision-making becomes dominant in the creation of political 
agenda in the whole system of governance? 
 
 
Overwhelming Particularism: the Case of Ukraine 
 
Modern Ukraine is an example of the consequences of the 
transformation of public policy-making into a ‘systemic 
                   




Studies of Changing Societies: Comparative and 
Interdisciplinary Focus Vol. 1’2017 
 
 
© SCS Journal 
74 
particularism’ of decision-making. For many years, Ukrainian 
political system was functioning according to the principles of 
clan-oligarchic governing. Policy-making served the interests of 
several family-based financial and industrial groups, which formed 
tight networks of decision-making. Particularistic clan-serving 
interests were embodied in legislative sphere. It decelerated several 
strategic reforms in economic, legislative and social spheres. 
Political particularism in decision-making became the only 
possible modus vivendi of governmental process in Ukraine. 
Subsidizing policy-making to the interests of financial and 
industrial groups and rent-seeking governmental officials led to 
total corruption that reached all levels of governing and all spheres 
of social life, including ‘three whales’ of state well-being: 
education, medicine and military service. Particularism was 
enhanced by localism. Social and cultural specificities of Western 
and Eastern Ukraine provided a strong basis for dividing electoral 
fields and lobbying interests of local political elites and business 
groups included into clan governing networks. Changes to 
electoral legislative basis contributed to electoral particularism. 
The election law was changed during almost every electoral cycle, 
and that was an effective particularistic, but still normative 
mechanism, by which Ukrainian power elites formed conditions 
for carrying out elections with guaranteed results.  
 
Localism was strengthened by different external priorities of the 
inhabitants of Western and Eastern Ukraine; that, respectively, 
were integration with the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures versus 
cooperation with Russia and further deepening into Eurasian 
entities. With rotation of power elites, the priorities of domestic 
policies and foreign strategies were also changed. For instance, at 
the time of Leonid Kuchma’s presidency the idea of diverse 
vectors of foreign policy was dominative, meanwhile at the time of 
Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency the priorities in foreign policy 
turned exclusively to the enhancement of interrelation with the 
USA and EU. The period of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency can 
be characterized by clear double standards in foreign policy: an 
official declaration of integration into the European Union co-
existed with actual lobbying of economic interests of ruling clans, 
primarily from Donetsk region, oriented towards Russia. The 
influence of particularistic interests of ruling elites from Donetsk 
ruined the possibility of signing the Agreement on Association 
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between Ukraine and the EU in 2013, with which at least half of 
Ukrainian population was connecting its future. Traditionally 
Luhansk and Donetsk regions showed lower level of support 
towards European perspective than other regions. As a pattern of 
selectivity to decision-making one can recognize the official 
refusal from signing the Association Agreement. The rejection of 
the fact that the strategic choice for the whole state is determined 
solely by the interests of Yanukovych family’s network eventually 
led to social unrest and protests, which quickly escalated into 
armed confrontation between pro-government forces and citizens. 
The consequences of social and political crisis in Ukraine was 
annexation of Crimea by Russia, separatism in Luhansk and 
Donetsk regions ended with a self-declaration of quasi-state 
entities, and a medium scale military conflict with thousands killed 
or wounded plus over a million of refugees or ‘internally 
displaced’ citizens.  
 
Although the change of government finally let Ukraine to sign the 
Association Agreement with the EU and to carry out a general 
course of reforms aimed at Western standards, the whole situation 
is a clear example of which consequences the particularism in 
decision-making may have, if it has a long-term dominance, i.e. 
becoming a fundamental principle of the entire state system. 
However, despite tragic results, in Ukraine the dominance of 
particularism in both inner and foreign policy appeared to be the 
main factor that prevented strengthening of autocratic tendencies 
up to the level of establishing of authoritarian regime, as it 
happened in several post-Soviet states: Russia, Belarus, Middle 
Asia countries. Again as a paradox, such a double negative 
influence of particularism on the political system saved a weak but 
still democratic form of governance.  
 
Is it Possible to Overcome Political Particularism? 
 
As mentioned earlier, despite the overall orientation of political 
decisions towards socially significant problems, it seems hardly 
possible to take into account the whole spectrum of public 
interests. Politics is the realm of intersection of interests and 
searching for compromises. That’s why, by contrast to legislative 
or organizational decisions, political decisions will always possess 
some element of particularism. Political decisions are always 
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decisions made ad hoc. At the same time, a significant misbalance 
on the involvement of interest in a favor of a certain party or 
limited number of participants (political leader, interest group, 
reference group – local, ethnic, family or religious) results in low 
level of legitimacy of the decision from the side of other 
participants of political processes. Is it possible to overcome the 
disproportionate political influence of political particularism in 
political decision-making? Researchers pointed out that the basis 
of dominance of political particularism is low ability of social 
layers to aggregate their interests (see Ramanna 2015: 165). This 
thesis can be hardly argued against. Paradoxically, despite growing 
operational opportunities for establishing communications, various 
social groups become increasingly invalid to articulate their 
interests in the area of political representation. Such a tendency 
towards vanishing of possibilities of standing for collective 
interests is related to a gradual decrease of working class and the 
occurrence of numerous spheres of individual employment, 
happening on the background of a crisis in political representation 
and ideological affiliation. 
 
Yet political particularism can be defeated or at least reduced to a 
safe level for the system by ‘the existence of multiple independent 
branches with veto power over policy initiatives’ (Gaviria et al 
2000: 9), as well as by the mechanisms of engagement citizens and 
NGOs into the process of decision-making through wide range of 
political representation. For the decision-making at the 
supranational level, the particularism can be lowered down via 
more open forms of club governance and wider engaging of non-
major actors into the process of formulation of global agenda, 
developing institutional mechanisms of participation by private 
and public organizations in international policy-making. 
 
Indeed the state governing system, at least in democratic regimes, 
has been designed to ensure the interests of all citizens, including a 
guaranteed right of disaffiliation. There are examples of highly 
heterogenic system, where political particularism does not act 
against general interests of society. Such countries show stability 
in functioning of a political system and economic development, 
high level of life and social insurance, low level of corruption and 
high degree of trust towards authorities. In international welfare 
ratings, they occupy top positions. For instance, Switzerland 
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despite having all prerequisite to localism and scholarly recognized 
tendency of decline of corporatist model (see Sciarini, Fischer and 
Traber 2015), still enables to find a balance of interests between 
various governmental and non-state actors, public preferences and 
interest groups. In Switzerland, the balancing mechanism is based 
on regular and compulsory referendums on various issues of public 
life. In such conditions, regular plebiscitary decisions prevent 
misbalanced character of decision-making and excessive political 
particularism. As one can see, political particularism according to 
its organizational forms and procedure models, on the one hand 
can help reduce the risk by speeding up decision-making, on the 
other hand, has ambiguous impact on the consequences. The 
problem that needs to be addressed at any level of governance – 
from local to global – is the introduction of mechanisms to prevent 
excessive growth of particularism in decision-making in terms of 




This work summarizes the most common views on forms and 
practices of particularism in political decision-making and on 
consequences it may have. In this study I was guided by several 
assumptions. First, the analysis of scientific literature on the 
question of particularism allows to find out that a political decision 
as a mechanism for power implementing has a particularistic 
nature. It should be stressed that even being exercised in the form 
of legislative acts in the area of public politics, a political decision 
always contains a particularistic component. As politics is a sphere 
of intersection of interests and searching for compromises, the 
strict following moral norms and rules for the benefit of public 
well-being seems to be a priori impossible.   
 
The second assumption is that the key category in the analysis of 
political particularism should be the interest of decision-makers. 
Dominance of a narrow range of interests in political decision-
making is the manifestation of particularism. Therefore, this study 
considered the forms of decision-making, which limit the number 
of participants on the inclusion of interest, e.g. ‘special interest 
groups’ and clubs. Procedures that enhance the particularistic 
component in political decision-making, such as logrolling and 
localism, and a practice of excluding a certain number of issues out 
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of political agenda for the benefit of ruling elite, have been 
revealed. 
 
The third assumption is the relevance of the network analysis as a 
methodological approach to studying particularism in political 
decision-making. Network analysis is the best to determine 
interests of participants, value-regulatory and socio-cultural 
context of political decision-making. The level of particularism for 
any approved decision can be assessed via identification of the 
hubs in the network, where power resources are concentrated, 
coupled to the estimation of the degree of the network’s openness 
for the public engagement. 
 
The analysis of theoretical developments and empirical studies 
showed that particularism has an ambiguous effect on 
consequences of decisions, and on the entire stability of the 
political system. It is important to note that despite all declared 
principles of pluralist democracy, at each level of governance – 
local or global – there is always a tendency to form interest groups 
or clubs fractions.  
 
Particularism in political decision-making can carry out a positive 
function in the case of accelerating the adoption of necessary laws 
or public reform. Through lobbying their particularistic goals, 
business groups or professional associations may contribute to the 
improvement or speeding up modernization of certain sectors. The 
electoral particularism in decision-making can serve the needs of 
individual communities, whose interests at the national level are 
not always sufficiently represented. Sometimes, the political 
system can benefit from particularism, which prevents the 
development of the full-scale autocracy.  
 
However, usually particularism creates the asymmetry in the 
inclusion of interests in favor of a narrow range of politicians or 
affiliated interest groups that can destructively influence public 
policies and badly affect the stability of the political system. 
Permeability of particularism into the public policy contributes to 
the development of shadow schemes of distributing social goods 
and strengthens the corruption. The long-term imbalance towards 
particularistic practices in political decision-making may slow 
down the economic growth and reduce the well-being of the 
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society, but also may lead to the destabilization of a political 
system by provoking social and political crises.  
 
On the example of modern Ukraine one can see that a continual 
creation of policies in favor of interests of clan networks or 
oligarchic groups, which can be defined as ‘systemic 
particularism’ in policy-making, had destructive consequences for 
the economic and social situation in the country and for the 
integrity of public system. Supranational entities, like the EU, also 
suffer from essential particularism in making political decisions, 
despite the declared universalism and pluralism of interests as the 
fundamental principles of their functioning. This can be achieved 
through switching on / off the ‘club mechanisms’ of policy-making 
or via fractionalization into formal or informal alliances for 
lobbying common interests or getting local benefits from 
participating in supranational governance. Embodied in 
institutionalized forms, the excessive particularism in decision-
making may penetrate into all spheres of a public control system 
and then eventually lead to disintegration processes, triggering 
conflicts. Yet, in spite of certain degree of particularism present in 
any political decision, it potentially can be balanced with other 
particularistic-driven actions, from what public interests would 
benefit. However, it requires the presence of effective institutional 
and procedure mechanisms for active engaging of citizens and 
public organizations into generation political agenda at all the 
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